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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Bernadine Duffy brought an Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act claim, 29 U.S.C. S 621 et seq., against her 
former employer, Paper Magic, Inc. Duffy argues that she 
was constructively discharged as a result of a continuing 
pattern of discrimination by Paper Magic. She appeals from 
the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Duffy began working for Paper Magic in 1986 as a 
Customer Service Representative. She was promoted to 
Senior Customer Service Representative in January 1987, 
and to Assistant Customer Service Manager in July 1989. 
As Assistant Customer Service Manager, her 
responsibilities included overseeing the order processing 
division. 
 
Duffy alleges that in August 1993, she was "passed over" 
for a promotion to Manager of the Order Processing 
Customer Service Department, for someone younger than 
she. A short time thereafter, however, Paper Magic 
promoted Duffy to Supervisor of Order Processing in the 
Order Processing/Customer Service Department. She 
contends that following this promotion, Paper Magic 
changed her title back to Assistant Customer Service 
Representative, even though her duties remained the same. 
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In September 1994, Paper Magic transferred Deborah 
Pica into the Order Processing/Customer Service 
Department as Supervisor of Customer Service. Pica was 
approximately thirty years old at the time. Duffy alleges 
that after Pica arrived, one of her supervisors refused to 
cooperate with her, continually harassed her, and refuted 
any of her suggestions to improve or correct matters in the 
department. In contrast, her supervisor "bent over 
backwards" to make Pica's life easier. 
 
In December of 1995, Duffy's title was changed to 
Supervisor of Order Processing. At this time, one of her 
supervisors explained that she and Pica were getting 3% 
raises to take on the added responsibility of new 
acquisitions. Duffy contends, however, that her co-workers 
informed her that Pica really got a 25% raise. She states 
that, the company, to justify this differential, made Pica the 
new Customer Service/Order Processing Manager. Duffy 
contends that she expressed interest in this position but 
her supervisor discouraged her because of her age, and of 
the long hours the position would ostensibly require. 
 
In addition, Duffy alleges that she was prevented from 
participating in the hiring process for the Order Processing 
Department, despite her supervisory position. She claims 
that Pica handled all interviews, and rebuffed her input. 
She further contends that, unlike the Customer Service 
side of the department, Order Processing had to wait 
months before getting approval to hire new staff. As a 
result, Duffy worked overtime hours, but unlike other 
salaried employees, did not receive overtime pay. 
 
Duffy alleges other inequities. She was one of two 
supervisors excluded from a company meeting during May 
of 1996. She was also excluded from a training seminar for 
supervisors. She further maintains that she was the only 
supervisor in the company who was given a weekly"report 
card" on her job performance by the School Marketing 
Department. She was also removed from all committees, 
including the computer committee and the total quality 
management committee. Additionally, she contends that 
she was reprimanded by the Human Relations Director for 
failing to participate in company events. According to Duffy, 
her nonparticipation resulted in a lack of cooperation from 
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others for work-related projects. She states that she 
complained about such conduct but nothing changed. As a 
result of these working conditions, Duffy's health 
deteriorated, requiring that she consult with a physician. 
 
Finally, Duffy maintains that her superiors made 
derogatory remarks about her age. Specifically, she alleges 
that her supervisor told her that "she was getting older and 
wasn't remembering things as she got older." Another 
supervisor reminded her that she was getting older and 
advised her to look for another job requiring fewer hours. 
 
Generally, Duffy was rated as an average to above 
average individual worker. However, her annual 
performance evaluations consistently reflected weakness in 
the areas of supervisory, managerial, and organizational 
skills. For example, in 1996, she was rated "high average" 
for her work but "low average, at best" for her supervisory 
skills. However, Duffy's salary was not reduced as a result 
of her evaluation nor were her responsibilities modified. She 
received an increase in salary for each year between 1986 
and 1996 and her salary doubled in the ten years that she 
was employed by Paper Magic. 
 
On July 24, 1996, Duffy resigned from her position at 
Paper Magic. On February 3, 1997, she filed an 
administrative charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. She also filed an 
administrative complaint with the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission on February 19, 1997. On May 7, 
1997, the PHRC formally dismissed Duffy's charge of 
discrimination as untimely, and for lacking any basis for 
equitable tolling of the time limitations. 
 
Later, Duffy filed this action against Paper Magic, alleging 
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
29 U.S.C. S 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq., the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. S 2101 et 
seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. S 951 
et seq., and Pennsylvania common law. 
 
Paper Magic filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss each count 
of Duffy's complaint. Duffy voluntarily withdrew her PHRA 
and wrongful discharge claims. The District Court then 
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partially granted Paper Magic's motion, and dismissed 
Duffy's ADA and WARN claims. The District Court 
concluded that Duffy failed to state a claim under the ADA 
since merely being overweight is not a disabling impairment 
under the ADA. The court dismissed Duffy's WARN claim 
because she failed to allege a "plant closing" or "mass 
layoff " triggering the statute's notice obligation. 
 
Discovery closed and Paper Magic moved for summary 
judgment on Duffy's ADEA claim, her only remaining claim. 
The District Court concluded that Duffy failed to 
demonstrate that she was constructively discharged or 
otherwise suffered an adverse employment action within the 
purview of the ADEA and entered summary judgment in 
favor of Paper Magic. 
 
Duffy filed a notice of appeal, challenging only the entry 
of summary judgment in favor of Paper Magic on her claim 
of age discrimination. We exercise plenary review the 
District Court's decision to grant summary judgment. See 
Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
II. 
 
The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating 
against individuals in hiring, discharge, compensation, 
term, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis 
of their age. See 29 U.S.C. S 623(a)(1). Age discrimination 
may be established by direct or indirect evidence. See 
Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 972 (3d Cir. 
1998). When evaluating ADEA discrimination claims based 
on indirect evidence, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination under the ADEA by 
demonstrating that she: (1) was a member of a protected 
class, i.e., that she was over forty, (2) is qualified for the 
position, (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, (4) 
and was ultimately replaced by a person sufficiently 
younger to permit an inference of age discrimination. See 
id. at 973.1 To survive a motion for summary judgment, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A prima facie case creates an inference of unlawful discrimination. The 
burden of production then shifts to the employer who can dispel the 
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evidence must be " `sufficient to convince a reasonable 
factfinder to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie 
case.' " Id. (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 
F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc)). Here, the 
District Court found that Duffy had failed to show a prima 
facie case because she did not produce evidence sufficient 
to convince a reasonable fact finder that she had 
established any adverse employment action. We agree. 
 
Duffy asserts that she established a prima facie case 
because she was constructively discharged, and thus 
suffered an adverse employment action. We employ an 
objective test to determine whether an employee can 
recover on a claim of constructive discharge. See id. at 974. 
Specifically, a court must determine "whether a reasonable 
jury could find that the [employer] permitted conditions so 
unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable person would have 
felt compelled to resign." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
Duffy claims that she was constructively discharged 
because she experienced a "continuous pattern of 
discriminatory treatment" at Paper Magic. As noted earlier, 
she contends that: 1) she was not considered for a 
promotion to Manager of the Customer Service/Order 
Processing Department because of her age; 2) her 
department was consistently understaffed and management 
delayed in providing needed assistance; 3) her supervisors 
made negative remarks about her age; 4) she was excluded 
from a training seminar for managers; 5) she was removed 
from work-related committees, such as the computer 
committee and the total quality management control 
committee; 6) she was prevented from participating in the 
hiring for the Order Processing Department, even though 
she was the Supervisor; 7) other employees and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
actions. See Connors, 160 F.3d at 974 n.2. If the employer meets this 
burden, the employee must then prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the articulated reasons are a pretext for discrimination. 
See id. Where the employee is unable to establish a prima facie case, 
however, no inference of discrimination is raised and the employer has 
no burden to proffer a reason for any action. Spangle v. Valley Forge 
Sewer Auth., 839 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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departments failed to cooperate with her; 8) she was the 
only supervisor in the company who was given a weekly 
"report card" by the School Marketing Department; 9) 
Human Resources reprimanded her for failing to participate 
in company events; and 10) other salaried employees were 
paid for overtime work, while she was not. 
 
The District Court held that, although the above 
allegations indicated that Duffy experienced stress and 
discomfort on the job, she did not provide sufficient 
evidence that she was constructively discharged or 
otherwise suffered an adverse employment action. The 
Court reasoned that Duffy's testimony focused almost 
entirely on her subjective view that Paper Magic 
constructively discharged her. Moreover, the Court noted 
that Duffy established none of the situations that we 
identified in Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hospital, 991 F.2d 
1159, 1161 (3d Cir. 1993), as suggesting constructive 
discharge. Specifically, Paper Magic never threatened to fire 
Duffy, encouraged her to resign from her position, or 
involuntarily transferred her to a less desirable position. 
Moreover, she received satisfactory job evaluations 
throughout her employment. And finally, there was no 
evidence that Duffy utilized an internal grievance procedure 
or requested a transfer within the company. 
 
The District Court correctly recognized that Duffy had 
failed to demonstrate any of the factors listed in Clowes. 
However, it is important to note that we have never made 
the Clowes factors an absolute requirement for recovery. 
See id. (noting that the plaintiff "cannot rely on many of the 
factors commonly cited by employees who claim to have 
been constructively discharged") (emphasis added). The 
absence of the factors in Clowes is not necessarily 
dispositive. Nonetheless, we agree with the District Court 
that Duffy was not constructively discharged. 
 
We have held that constructive discharge may occur 
"when the employer is aware that the employee has been 
subjected to a continuous pattern of harassment and the 
employer does nothing to stop it." Aman v. Cort Furniture 
Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1084-85 (3d Cir. 1996). In 
Aman, the plaintiff was continuously subjected to racially- 
based insults and false accusations of favoritism, 
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wrongdoing, and incompetence; she was repeatedly 
admonished not to touch or steal anything; she was forced 
to do menial tasks not assigned to white employees; her co- 
workers withheld information and stole documents that she 
needed to perform her job; and her employer threatened to 
"get rid of her." 85 F.3d at 1077-80. When the employee 
retained an attorney and submitted a formal complaint of 
discrimination, she was subjected to additional false 
accusations of incompetence and the abusive conduct of 
her co-workers intensified. See id. at 1085. On these facts, 
we held that the employer was not entitled to summary 
judgment on a claim of constructive discharge. See id. 
 
Later, in Levandos v. Stern Entertainment, 860 F.2d 1227 
(3d Cir. 1988), we held that several incidents of 
discriminatory conduct were legally sufficient to raise the 
issue of constructive discharge.2 Specifically, the plaintiff- 
employee filed an affidavit stating, inter alia , that: she was 
the only woman in a management position; she was 
excluded from management meetings; the general manager 
of the restaurant boasted that the plaintiff `would not be 
there long'; management told other employees that the 
plaintiff did not fit the mold of a maitre d'hotel because she 
was a woman; the owner asked an employee to find a man 
to replace the plaintiff; management falsely accused her of 
stealing, drinking, and fraternizing with employees; and on 
one evening, she discovered wine bottles in her locker to 
make it appear as if she were stealing. See id.  at 1228. 
Additionally, a co-worker submitted an affidavit praising 
the plaintiff 's work and reputation and stating that 
management disliked women. In a complaint filed with the 
EEOC, the plaintiff alleged that she was not permitted to 
order supplies although a male manager was able to do so, 
and that she was replaced by a male friend of the chef. The 
plaintiff resigned, stating that her decision was precipitated 
by the accusations of stealing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We also emphasized that a single, non-trivial incident of 
discrimination may be egregious enough to compel a reasonable person 
to resign. See Levandos, 860 F.2d at 1232. In such a case, "an 
employment discrimination plaintiff may simply face a more difficult 
burden of proof in establishing the employer's liability . . . ." Id. 
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We reversed the District Court and held that the record 
"contain[ed] more than a scrap of evidentiary material, . . . 
from which a fact-finder could infer that conditions at the 
restaurant were so intolerable that a maitre'd of reasonable 
sensitivity would be forced to resign," and that the 
plaintiff 's affidavit alone was sufficient to defeat summary 
judgment. Id. at 1231 & n.7. 
 
Although the present case is similar to Aman and 
Levendos in that it concerns a pattern of conduct rather 
than an isolated incident, the situation does not reach the 
threshold of "intolerable conditions." Although certainly 
stressful and frustrating, the alleged conduct would not 
compel a reasonable person to resign. For example, in 
contrast to the changing duties of the plaintiffs in Aman, 
Duffy's tasks remained the same while she was the 
Supervisor of Order Processing. She was never assigned 
degrading or menial tasks and she consistently received 
pay increases during her employment. Duffy does allege 
that her department was understaffed and that 
management deliberately delayed providing needed 
assistance, thereby making her job more difficult. Duffy's 
job, however, did not become impossible as a result of these 
staff shortages. Rather, the shortages simply required her 
to work longer hours until help arrived. This made her job 
more stressful, but not unbearable. See Connors , 160 F.3d 
at 975 ("[E]mployees are not guaranteed stress-free 
environments and [ ] discrimination laws`cannot be 
transformed into a palliative for every workplace grievance, 
real or imagined, by the simple expedient of quitting."). 
And, as Duffy admits, Paper Magic did eventually provide 
assistance to her department. 
 
Like the staff shortages, Duffy's exclusion from 
committees, hiring decisions, a single staff meeting, and a 
single supervisor seminar would not render a job so 
unbearable that she was forced to resign. Although they 
may have disappointed and somewhat upset her, such 
exclusions did not affect Duffy's ability to do her job as 
Supervisor of Office Processing. As such, although Duffy 
may have subjectively believed that these circumstances 
were too onerous to bear, no reasonable trier of fact could 
conclude that exclusion from committee membership or 
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lack of hiring authority renders working conditions 
objectively intolerable. See Gray, 957 F.2d at 1083 ("The 
law does not permit an employee's subjective perceptions to 
govern a claim of constructive discharge."). 
 
Moreover, Duffy's weekly "report card" and lack of 
overtime pay do not warrant resignation. Although the 
"report card" constituted close supervision, Duffy does not 
allege that it placed greater requirements on her than 
others or imposed unreasonably exacting standards of her 
job performance. It merely provided her with feedback and 
information. Thus, it does not amount to overzealous 
supervision that supports an inference of intolerable 
working conditions. With respect to the lack of overtime 
pay, it is undisputed that Duffy was an exempt supervisory 
employee who was not entitled to overtime pay under 
federal law. See 29 U.S.C. S 213(a)(1). 
 
Duffy's attempt to use her physician's opinion that her 
job had an adverse affect upon her health to prove that her 
working conditions were intolerable also fails. These health 
problems support an inference that Duffy's environment 
was stressful. However, as noted above, a stressful 
environment does not amount to constructive discharge. 
 
Duffy's contentions that her supervisors, because of her 
age, made disparaging remarks and failed to give her a 
promotion provide some support for her claim. With respect 
to the alleged remarks about age, she contends that one of 
her supervisors told her that "she was getting older and 
wasn't remembering things as she got older." She also 
contends that another supervisor reminded her that she 
was getting older and suggested that she look for another 
job with fewer hours. She alleges that these comments were 
made several times over the course of her employment with 
Paper Magic.3 Although these comments were 
inappropriate, they were not sufficiently derogatory or 
offensive to compel a reasonable person to resign. 
Additionally, they did not happen on a constant or even 
frequent basis. Thus, they did not create intolerable 
working conditions. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Duffy also alleges demeaning remarks about her weight but they are 
not relevant to her age discrimination claim. 
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Regarding her "missed" promotion, Duffy's deposition 
asserts that her supervisor told her that Pica was better 
suited for the position because she was younger and 
therefore could manage the longer hours. She reports that 
her supervisor told her that "she was getting older now" 
and that she "should just do her regular job." We recognize 
that being "passed over" for a promotion based on age 
rather than merit would be highly frustrating and upsetting 
to a reasonable employee. However, because Duffy has not 
produced evidence that she was qualified for the position of 
Customer Service/Order Processing Department Manager, 
her missed promotion cannot support her constructive 
discharge claim. See Spangle, 839 F.2d at 173-74 
(dismissing constructive discharge claim where employee's 
prima facie case was insufficient because he was not 
qualified for supervisory position). Duffy's job appraisals 
indicate weakness in the areas of supervisory, managerial, 
and organizational skills. For example, Duffy was counseled 
on several occasions to improve her supervisory skills. In 
her 1994 appraisal, her supervisor wrote: "It is felt that 
Bernie at times is part of the problem not the solution. 
Bernie must become a supervisor and separate herself from 
friends and the company grapevine." Duffy's 1995 
performance evaluation included similar comments 
concerning her supervisory and management skills:"No 
problems with quality of work--only question is quality of 
supervision part of job." The 1995 report concludes: 
"Bernie, as an individual worker, is high average or above, 
but when considering performance as m[anager] of 
dep[artment], the rating is low average, at best, and below 
average at times when she is upset or in disagreement with 
m[anagement]." In 1996, her overall performance was rated 
average, but she was again rated "low average, at best" for 
her supervisory skills. Without proof of her qualification to 
perform the supervisory duties of the management 
promotion, the fact that Duffy may reasonably have found 
it intolerable that she was "passed over" for her age is not 
enough to raise an inference of age discrimination. 
 
Finally, we note that Duffy's own explanation as to why 
she left Paper Magic supports our conclusion that she was 
not constructively discharged. When pressed to explain why 
she elected to resign, Duffy responded that her decision 
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was based, in part, on her son's recent graduation from 
college and her resultant financial ability to leave. She 
stated: 
 
        Well, I thought about it, and I just couldn't take it no 
       more. I wasn't getting cooperation from anybody. In my 
       opinion, I was just being forced out. Plus, I had my son 
       in college and he was on his own, so in that situation 
       I could, you know, I could afford to leave. Other years 
       I couldn't afford to leave and stuff. 
 
App. at 323. This admission undermines Duffy's claim that 
she was constructively discharged. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, we hold that Duffy did not produce evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could find an adverse 
employment action, which is a prerequisite to a successful 
age discrimination claim. Therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court's summary judgment. 
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